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        Some Artificial Intelligence Tools for Argument Evaluation: An Introduction 
 
Abstract 
 
Even though tools for identifying and analyzing arguments are now in wide use in the field of 
argumentation studies, so far there is a paucity of resources for evaluating real arguments, aside from 
using deductive logic or Bayesian rules that apply to inductive arguments. In this paper it is shown that 
recent developments in artificial intelligence in the area of computational systems for modeling defeasible 
argumentation reveal a different approach that is currently making interesting progress. It is shown how 
these systems provide the general outlines for a system of argument evaluation that can be applied to legal 
arguments as well as everyday conversational arguments to assist a user to evaluate an argument. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
     Now in the field of argumentation studies there are useful tools that can be applied to the task 
of identifying arguments (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004), including argumentation 
schemes, and there are useful tools that can be applied to the task of analyzing arguments, 
namely argument diagrams, also often called argument maps (Reed, Walton and Macagno, 
2007). But so far there is no widely accepted calculative tool that can be applied to the task of 
evaluating everyday defeasible arguments (Schiappa, 2002). There is the literature on fallacies 
(Tindale, 2007), but the tools provided there apply only to the more extreme kinds of cases in 
which an argument is so bad that it can be evaluated as committing a fallacy of a known type. 
     On the other hand, considerable advances have been made in the field of artificial intelligence 
on providing formal argumentation systems that can be used to help a person to evaluate 
arguments (Prakken, 2010; Gordon, 2010; Verheij, 2014). These computational systems of 
argument evaluation have so far mainly been tested on legal argumentation. These systems are 
also technical in nature, and are not yet widely known in argumentation studies outside the 
community of researchers specializing in artificial intelligence and law. But the project of 
modeling legal argumentation bears many interesting similarities with the broader project of 
studying argumentation in natural language discourse generally. 
     Hence it is very useful at this time to try to explain in a relatively non-technical manner how 
these new tools might be applied to the task of argument evaluation in examples of kinds of 
cases that would be typical of problems of argument evaluation faced by those working in the 
area of natural language argumentation studies. That is the aim of this paper. 
     In section 2, a very brief survey is given of how some argumentation systems currently being 
developed in artificial intelligence can be applied to the problem of argument evaluation. In 
section 3 it is shown how argumentation schemes are used as part of the procedure for argument 
evaluation in these systems. In section 4 a very simple example of an argument is used to 
illustrate how these features apply to the argument. In section 5 the argument in the example is 
evaluated using techniques adapted from one of the computational systems. In section 6 a more 
sophisticated example is introduced, a case used by the ancient Greek sophist Antiphon to 
illustrate how the prosecutor in a murder trial can construct a plausible argument to provide 
evidence that the defendant committed the crime. In section 7, argument evaluation tools are 
applied to the argumentation in this example. Section 8 introduces some more advanced tools, 
and section 9 presents some conclusions and some qualifications. 
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2. AI Systems for Argument Evaluation 
 
     Bayesian methods are widely used in artificial intelligence. The standard Bayesian method of 
evaluating arguments (Hahn, Harris and Oaksford, 2013) assigns numerical probability values to 
the components of an argument and uses Bayesian rules to give as output a numerical probability 
value for the strength of the argument. These include Bayesian rules defining negation, 
conjunction, disjunction and conditional probability. This method originated with applying such 
rules of estimating probabilities of outcomes in games of chance and other statistical settings. 
Such methods are based on the assignment of a prior probability value which is then transformed 
into a probability value assigned to the outcome of the operation. A statement is assigned a prior 
probability value between 0 and 1, and then a formula (Bayes’ Rule, explained below) is used to 
calculate a higher or lower probability value as an outcome. A statement that is a logical 
tautology is assigned a probability value of 1, and a statement that is logically inconsistent is 
assigned a probability value of 0. The conditional probability rule is determined by the negation 
and conjunction rules. According to the negation rule, the probability of ~A, the negation of 
statement A, is calculated as 1 minus the prior probability of A. According to the conjunction 
rule, the probability of A & B (A and B) has the probability of A times the probability of B, 
assuming that A and B are independent of each other. According to the disjunction rule, the 
probability of A v B (A or B) is the probability of A plus the probability of B. 
     The conditional probability rule defines the probability of B given A as the probability of A & 
B divided by the probability of A. This definition can be used to derive a form of the rule for 
calculating conditional probability widely known as Bayes’ rule, where 𝑃𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) refers to the 
probability of A given B. 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) = Pr(𝐵|𝐴) x Pr (𝐴)
𝑃𝑃(𝐵)  
 
The probability of A given B can be calculated from knowing the probability of B given A based 
on this rule, assuming that the prior probability values of A and B are known. Using this rule, an 
argument can be evaluated to either increase or decrease the probability of its conclusion based 
on assignments of probability to its premises (or leave it the same). 
     The Bayesian rules are widely used in many areas of science. They can also be used in some 
instances in legal argumentation, for example in cases of presentation of forensic evidence where 
probability values can be assigned by experts, and judges or juries can then try to decide on the 
strength of the evidence based on these numerical values. But whether Bayesian calculations 
could be used to evaluate arguments of the kind a judge or jury generally needs to evaluate in a 
trial by themselves, is a highly controversial subject in the field of artificial intelligence and law 
(Bench-Capon, 2002). There is a worry that assigning precise probability values to premises and 
conclusions in such arguments might be based on a false appearance of precision that leads to 
artificial results and even fallacies, and that confuses juries.  
     Studies by social scientists have shown that argument evaluations performed on familiar 
kinds of arguments used in common sense reasoning diverge radically from results of applying 
Bayesian rules. The most famous example is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most famous 
examples concerning the conjunction rule is the case of Linda the bank teller (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1982). They tested the following example concerning judgments of conjunctive 
probability by posing a hypothetical case and asking people to answer the question about which 
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outcome to choose. Suppose that Linda is a 31-year-old outspoken and very bright bank teller 
who majored in philosophy. In addition, suppose that it is known that Linda was concerned with 
issues of social justice when she was a student, and she participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations. Those to whom the example was described were asked which of two statements 
is more probable: (1) Linda is a bank teller, or (2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement. Most of the respondents chose answer (2). This poll appears to indicate that 
the respondents’ way of choosing between (1) and (2) violated the Bayesian rules for conjunctive 
probability. According to the Bayesian rule, the conjunction of two statements A and B is less 
than the probability of either A or B individually. This outcome might suggest either that those 
who took the poll were illogical or that the Bayesian rules for probability do not correctly 
represent the ways we ordinarily arrive at conclusions by logical reasoning. 
     While it is true that Bayesian methods are much more widely used in AI than computational 
models of argument, Bayesian methods are not accepted by the mainstream in the computational 
models of argument community, which is a subfield of artificial intelligence, as a model of 
argument evaluation. There has been some work on exploring relationships between Bayesian 
methods and computational models of argument, and there is some interest in trying to 
incorporate some results from Bayesian networks into computational models of argument, but 
this work is still in its infancy and remains outside the mainstream line of research based on 
systems discussed below in this paper, such as Dung Abstract Argumentation Frameworks and 
structured models of argument such as ASPIC+ and Carneades. 
     Nevertheless, because the Bayesian rules are so widely used and accepted in many scientific 
fields, it is very hard to challenge them as a way of rationally evaluating arguments generally. 
Still the question remains whether or not they can be applied to ordinary arguments such as those 
used in conversational argumentation in natural language, and legal argumentation, which is also 
expressed in natural language. Some formal computational systems being developed in artificial 
intelligence use the Bayesian rules, but there are others that do not. Below, some of the systems 
that do not need to rely on the Bayesian rules for evaluating arguments are outlined, presenting 
the reader with some alternatives to Bayesian systems. 
     The formal computational argumentation system DefLog (Verheij, 2003) has an automated 
argument assistant called ArguMed that helps a user to construct an argument diagram for a 
given case (Verheij, 2003, 320). ArguMed (http://www.ai.rug.nl/~verheij/aaa/argumed3.htm) is 
available at no cost on the Internet. DefLog is based on two primitive notions, defeasible 
implication and dialectical negation (Verheij, 2003, 323). Dialectical negation represents the 
defeat of an assumption. In this system there are justified assumptions and defeated assumptions. 
Such a set has to meet two conditions (Verheij, 2007, 197). To qualify as justified, an assumption 
must not be defeated by an argument having justified statements as premises. In DefLog 
(Verheij, 2007, 187), the notion of one argument a1 attacking another argument a2 is modeled as 
an undercutting defeater in Pollock’s (1995) sense, meaning that a1 defeasibly implies the 
dialectical negation of a2. It may seem strange to the reader that an argument such as a2 can be 
negated in the system. But that is only because arguments are modeled as defeasible conditionals 
in DefLog and such a conditional is treated as a kind of statement. 
     The formal argumentation system ASPIC+ is based on a logical language L consisting of a set 
of strict and defeasible inference rules used to build arguments from a knowledge base K. K  
consists of a set of propositions that can be used as premises that can be combined with the 
inference rules to generate arguments (Prakken, 2010). An example of a strict inference rule 
would be the deductively valid rule of modus ponens of classical logic. An example of a 
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defeasible inference rule would be the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion: 
E is an expert in domain D; E asserts that proposition A; A is within domain D; therefore A can 
be tentatively accepted subject to critical questioning. Arguments are trees containing nodes 
representing propositions from L, and lines from a set of nodes φ1, . . ., φn to a node ψ 
representing an argument from premises φ1, . . ., φn to a conclusion ψ. ASPIC+ (Prakken and 
Sartor, 1997) evaluates argumentation by using abstract argumentation frameworks (Dung, 
1995). 
      In a Dung-style abstract argumentation framework, the proponent starts with an argument he 
wants to evaluate and when the opponent has his turn, he must provide a defeating 
counterargument. In such a system each argument can be attacked by other arguments, which can 
themselves be attacked by additional arguments. The typical result is a graph structure 
representing a series of attacks and counterattacks in an argumentation sequence of the following 
sort: a1 attacks a2, a2 attacks a3, a3 attacks a2, and so forth. An argument is refuted if it is attacked 
by any other argument that is accepted and not refuted, and is accepted only if it survives all 
attacks against it. 
     Suppose that a3 = ‘We should bring back the death penalty’, a2 = ‘There is not enough 
evidence to show that the death penalty is a deterrent.’ and a3 = ‘Lack of evidence is not enough 
to prove that the death penalty is not a deterrent’. Let’s say that, to begin with all three arguments 
are accepted, as indicated in figure 1, where green (which appears as gray in the printed version) 
in an argument node indicates acceptance.  
 
                            
 
            Figure 1: First Step in an Abstract Argumentation Framework 
 
But consider what happens next. Since a2 is accepted, and a2 attacks a3, a3 is no longer 
accepted. This is shown in figure 2. The white background indicates that a3 is not accepted. 
 
                            
 
            Figure 2: Second Step in an Abstract Argumentation Framework 
 
But now consider what happens when a1 is taken into account. Argument a1 is accepted, and a1 
attacks a2, so a2 is no longer accepted. But now, as shown in figure 3, a3 is reinstated. It is now 
accepted once again, since it is no longer attacked by an argument that is accepted.  
 
                            
 
            Figure 3: Third Step in an Abstract Argumentation Framework 
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A three-valued way of talking about arguments is often adopted in abstract argumentation 
frameworks. An argument that is accepted is said to be ‘in’, an argument that is rejected is said to 
be ‘out’, and an argument that is neither accepted nor rejected is said to be ‘neither in nor out’.  
Abstract argumentation frameworks can be extended to provide several semantics of acceptance 
to decide if several arguments can be accepted together. For example, a complete extension is a 
set of arguments that is able to defend itself, including all arguments it defends (van Gijzel and 
Nilsson, 2013, 3).  
     The term ‘graph’ has many meanings, but a graph is defined in the mathematical field of 
graph theory as an ordered pair (V, E), where E is a subset of the two-element subsets of V 
(Harary, 1972, 9).  V is as a set of vertices, sometimes called points or nodes. E is a set of edges, 
sometimes called lines or arcs. It is customary to represent a graph as a diagram where the nodes 
are joined by lines. In a directed graph, the edges have a direction associated with them. For 
example, in a standard argument diagram the nodes are propositions (premises or conclusions) 
and the lines are arrows, meant to represent inferences joining the propositions together.  
     The Carneades Argumentation System (CAS) (Gordon, 2010)1 was named after the Greek 
philosopher who advocated a fallibilistic epistemology (Thorsrud, 2002). CAS models arguments 
as argument graphs consisting of argument nodes connected to statement nodes. Formally, an 
argument graph is a directed graph ⟨𝑆, A, P, 𝐶⟩ consisting of four elements. 𝑆 is a set of 
statement nodes, 𝐴 is a set of argument nodes, 𝑃 is a set of premises, and 𝐶 is a set of 
conclusions. Nodes represented as rectangles in a graph represent propositions that function as 
premises and conclusions of arguments. Circular argument nodes in a CAS graph contain 
notation representing different kinds of arguments corresponding to argumentation schemes. A 
distinctive feature of CAS is that it distinguishes between pro and con arguments in an argument 
graph. A pro argument supports a conclusion or another argument. A con argument attacks a 
conclusion or another argument. In any CAS argument graph, one of the statements is designated 
at the outset as the main issue (ultimate claim being supported or contested). Newer versions of 
CAS argument graphs can contain cycles, such as the CAS argument graph in figure 4.  
     In CAS, argument graphs are evaluated by assuming that an audience determines whether the 
premises of an argument are accepted or not, and then calculates whether the conclusion should 
be accepted based on premises and on the argumentation scheme that forms the link joining the 
premises to the conclusion). Conflicts between pro and con arguments are resolved using a 
variety of proof standards, including preponderance of the evidence and beyond reasonable 
doubt (Gordon and Walton, 2009).  
     CAS is capable of representing deductive and inductive arguments but can also use 
argumentation schemes to evaluate instances of defeasible arguments that do not fall into either 
of these categories, such as argument from expert opinion. The conclusion of a defeasible 
argument is only presumptively true. CAS has mainly been tested on examples of legal 
arguments, but may be used to model arguments in any domain. In the beginning of its 
development, CAS used graphs in its argument diagrams that were acyclic, meaning that they 
could not contain cycles. Figure 12 is an example. However, the more recent versions of the 
model overcame this limitation by mapping CAS argument frameworks onto abstract argument 
frameworks. It has been shown that the 2007 version of CAS can be simulated using ASPIC+ 
(van Gijzel and Prakken, 2012), but it can be conjectured that it is not an isomorphism, because it 
has not been shown that ASPIC+ can be simulated using CAS.  
 
                                                 
1 CAS is open source software, available at http://carneades.github.com/.   
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3. Argumentation Schemes 
 
     The argumentation scheme for the argument from expert opinion can succinctly be 
formulated as follows. 
 
Major Premise: E is an expert in domain D. 
First Minor Premise: E asserts that A is true.  
Second Minor Premise: A is within D. 
Conclusion: A may tentatively be accepted as true. 
 
This scheme can also be formulated in an expanded conditional version that reveals another 
element of the inferential structure of the scheme. 
 
(P1) Conditional Premise: If E is an expert in domain D, and E asserts that A is true, and 
A is within D, then A may tentatively be accepted as true. 
(P2) Major Premise: E is an expert in domain D. 
(P3) First Minor Premise: E asserts that A is true.  
(P4) Second Minor Premise: A is within D. 
(C) Conclusion: A may tentatively be accepted as true. 
 
The expanded conditional version of the scheme has the following logical structure, where P1, P2 
and P3 and P4 are meta-variables for the premises and C is a meta-variable for the conclusion. 
 
If P1, P2, P3 and P4 then C 
P1, P2, P3 and P4 
Therefore C 
 
Put in this format, the scheme for argument from expert opinion looks like a substitution instance 
of modus ponens (MP) as an inference, even though it is not a deductive MP argument. It is 
important to emphasize that this scheme needs to be seen as defeasible in nature when taken as a 
representation of argument from expert opinion. The reason is that the literature on argument 
from expert opinion has shown that it is a form of reasoning that can be erroneous in some 
instances. Exploiting the tendency to take what an expert says as final has been identified with 
erroneous appeals to authority in which an arguer overlooks required premises of the scheme or 
overlooks critical questions that need to be raised (Walton, 1997). However, whether such 
erroneous appeals are fallacies is a more complex question (Woods, 2013). 
     To better represent the logical form of argument from expert opinion we need to see it as 
having a form of argument called defeasible modus ponens (DMP) by (Walton, 2002). DMP has 
been adopted as a rule of inference in computational argumentation systems. Verheij (2000, 232) 
showed that defeasible argumentation schemes should fit a form of argument he called modus 
non excipiens: as a rule, if P then Q; P; it is not the case that there is an exception to the rule that 
if P then Q; therefore Q. Even more generally, many defeasible arguments fit this form. Consider 
the canonical Tweety example: If Tweety is a bird, Tweety flies; Tweety is a bird; therefore 
Tweety flies. Current computational argumentation systems such as ASPIC+, DefLog and CAS 
(the Carneades Argumentation System) use DMP as an inference rule. 
     Where => is the symbol for the defeasible conditional, DMP is has the following form. 
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Major Premise: A => B 
Minor Premise: A 
Conclusion: B can be tentatively accepted. 
 
The first premise states: If A is true then generally, but subject to exceptions, B can tentatively be 
accepted as true. Following along these lines, the scheme for argument from expert opinion can 
now be cast into the following DMP format. 
 
Conditional Premise: (E is an expert & E says that A is true & A is in D) => A. 
First Minor Premise: E is an expert.  
Second Minor Premise: E says that A. 
Third Minor Premise: A is in D. 
Conclusion: A can be tentatively accepted. 
 
Note however that this form of the scheme is not identical to DMP because the conditional in the 
major premise has a conjunctive antecedent. The scheme has the following form, where the 
minor premises are P1, P2 and P3.  
 
 (P1 & P2 & P3) => C  
 P1  
 P2  
 P3 
Therefore C 
 
But this form of argument is a substitution instance of the DMP form. So we can say that many 
of the most common defeasible argumentation schemes, including the argument from expert 
opinion, can be expressed as substitution instances of the DMP form of reasoning. 
 
4. The Vermeer Example  
 
     The following example, which we will call the expert opinion example, can be used to explain 
in a simplified way, how argumentation is evaluated in CAS. In a forensic investigation of some 
potentially valuable fine art, the dispute is about whether a particular painting is a genuine 
Vermeer. One party to the dispute, the proponent, claims that the painting is a genuine Vermeer 
by citing some expert opinion evidence. She says that judging a Vermeer painting to be genuine 
falls under the field of art history, and Alice, an expert in art history, says that the painting is a 
genuine Vermeer. The other party to the dispute, the respondent, denies that the painting is a 
genuine Vermeer, and advances an argument to support his contention. He agrees that judging a 
Vermeer painting to be genuine falls under the field of art history, but cites the opinion of 
another expert in art history, Bob, who has claimed that the painting is not a genuine Vermeer. 
Here we have a pair of arguments, each one being an argument from expert opinion, that are 
deadlocked. The situation is often called the battle of the experts. Finally, there is a third 
argument to be considered. The proponent alleges that Bob is biased, and supports this allegation 
by claiming that Bob was paid a large sum of money to say that the painting is not genuine. 
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     The pro-contra argument in this example is represented in the argument diagram shown in 
figure 4. The ultimate conclusion of the argument, the statement that the painting is a genuine 
Vermeer, is shown at the far left. At the top an argument with three premises is shown. The 
argument is represented by a circular node containing a plus sign. The plus sign indicates that it 
is a pro argument. Information about the argumentation scheme is contained within the 
programming of CAS, but is not shown in the nodes in figure 4. Nevertheless the argument at the 
top fits the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion. Just under this top 
argument, a second argument from expert opinion is shown, but it is a con argument as indicated 
by the minus sign in its argument node. 
 
 
 
                      Figure 4: The Interpretation of the Expert Opinion Example  
 
     So far then, we have a pro argument from expert opinion and a con argument from expert 
opinion. The two arguments share a common premise, the statement that judging a Vermeer 
painting to be genuine falls under the field of art history. Since we have both a pro and con 
argument for the same conclusion at this point in the argument evaluation, it looks like the 
outcome might be a deadlock. But below these two arguments, there is a third argument to be 
considered. It is a con argument that is directed against the con argument just above it. The 
premise of this con argument is supported by a pro argument shown just to the right of it at the 
bottom of the figure. Since the proponent’s side has this additional argument attacking the 
respondent’s argument, it looks like the proponent’s argument should ultimately win. 
     To start the procedure of evaluating the argumentation in this example let’s consider the 
audience. Do they accept the premises of the argument or not? Let’s say that the audience 
accepts all three of the minor premises. They accept that Alice says that the painting is a genuine 
Vermeer, they accept that Alice is an expert in art history, and they accept the statement that 
judging a Vermeer painting to be genuine falls under the field of art history. Of course they 
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might not accept these premises. They might bring forward evidence to critically question the 
claim that Alice is really a certified expert in art history, by disputing Alice’s credentials for 
example. But for the sake of keeping the example simple, let’s say that the audience does accept 
these three minor premises. Placing these assumptions within the form of argument from expert 
opinion, they accept premises P1, P2 and P3. But do they accept the conditional premise (P1 & P2 
& P3) => C? Since this premise represents the scheme for argument from expert opinion, let’s 
say that the audience accepts this form of argumentation. For example, in a legal tribunal, expert 
opinion testimony is admissible as a form of evidence, even though it is a defeasible form 
argument that is subject to critical questioning and cross-examination. 
     If we look back to figure 4, we can see that there is a mapping from the logical form of the 
argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion to its use as a pro-argument from expert 
opinion in the top argument shown in figure 4. This correspondence is shown below. 
 
(P1 & P2 & P3) => C [form of the defeasible scheme for argument from expert opinion] 
 P1 [accepted by the audience] 
 P2 [accepted by the audience] 
 P3 [accepted by the audience] 
Therefore C can be taken to be accepted by the audience. 
 
This form of argument indicates that since the audience has accepted all four premises of the 
argument in this instance, because the argument is a substitution instance of DMP, the audience 
must also accept the conclusion C. Audience acceptance of the conclusion would be justified, so 
long as the argument has not been successfully attacked by a rebuttal, undercutter or premise 
defeater. The DMP form is shown below. 
 
(P1 & P2 & P3) => C  
 P1 & P2 & P3 
Therefore C 
 
This inner defeasible logic is programmed into CAS, but the user can evaluate arguments with it 
by employing the argument mapping tool to carry out argument evaluations. 
 
5. Evaluating the Argument in the Vermeer Example 
 
     CAS has developed through four main versions (see https://github.com/carneades). The first 
version was implemented during 2006-2008. The second version (2011) has a graphical user 
interface for drawing diagrams to analyze and evaluate argument, and is still available. In this 
version, an argument is evaluated as justifying its conclusion if the premises of the argument are 
acceptable (in) and the argument has not been undercut by other arguments that defeat it (Gordon 
and Walton, 2006; Gordon, Prakken and Walton, 2007). A more complex method of argument 
evaluation also available in the second version is the attaching of numerical weights to the 
argument representing the strength of the argument according to the audience, represented as a 
fraction between zero and one. In this paper the simpler method of the second version is used, for 
purposes of exposition, but then later the more complex method is described using a simple 
example. The third version of CAS is a web-based version for policy discussions, developed in 
2010-2015. A fourth version, currently under development, but not yet available, evaluates 
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arguments by two criteria: (1) whether the audience accepts the premises and (2) whether the 
argument properly instantiates an argumentation scheme. The previous versions cannot evaluate 
cumulative arguments, where new evidence can alter the acceptability value of an argument 
upwards or downwards, but the new version has this capability. 
     Next it is shown how CAS evaluates the argumentation in the Vermeer example by breaking 
it down into a series of steps. The first step is displayed in figure 5. 
     
 
                Figure 5: First Step in Evaluating the Expert Opinion Example 
 
In figure 5 the three premises of the argument at the top are shown with a green background, 
indicating that all three premises are accepted. To simplify the example, let’s assume that the 
argument fits the requirements for the argumentation scheme for expert opinion. Put in other 
terms, this means that it is a defeasibly valid argument. Given that the premises are accepted and 
that the argument is valid, CAS automatically shows the conclusion is accepted. Hence in figure 
6, the ultimate conclusion of the argument is shown in a text box with a green background.              
     Next let’s turn to figure 6. In figure 6, the second argument from the top, is a con argument 
from expert opinion. In figure 6 all three premises of the con argument from expert opinion are 
shown as accepted, and the argument node containing the minus sign is shown with a green 
background as well, indicating that the premises of the argument are acceptable and the 
argument has not been undercut. 
     As shown in figure 6, the con argument rebuts the prior pro argument by attacking the 
conclusion of the pro argument. Expressed in Pollock’s (1995) terminology, this argument is a 
rebutter, as opposed to an undercutter.  (Pollock, 1995) distinguished between two kinds of 
counter-arguments he called rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters (often referred to as 
rebutters and undercutters). A rebutter gives a reason for denying a claim by offering reasons to 
think it is false (Pollock, 1995, 40). An undercutter attacks the inferential link between the claim 
and the reason supporting it by undermining the reason that supported the claim. 
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                Figure 6: Second Step in Evaluating the Expert Opinion Example 
 
     How this rebutter argument is a substitution instance of DMP can be shown as follows, where 
P4 is the statement that Bob says that the painting is not a genuine Vermeer and P5 is the 
statement that Bob is an expert in art history. 
 
(P3 & P4 & P5) => ~ C  
 P3 & P4 & P5 
Therefore ~ C 
 
The situation we have now can be summed up as follows. First there was a pro argument 
supporting the conclusion that the painting is a genuine Vermeer. Next there was an attacking 
argument, a con argument directed against that same conclusion. Because there is a con 
argument against the conclusion, and that con argument is not only valid but also has three of its 
premises accepted, the pro argument above it is successfully rebutted. This means that the 
ultimate conclusion of the argument can no longer be accepted. So CAS shows it in a text box 
with a white background. 
     Next let’s look to figure 7 to see what happens once the third argument is taken into account. 
In figure 7, both premises at the bottom right supporting the argument for the conclusion that 
Bob is biased are accepted, as indicated by each being shown in a text box with a green 
background. Moreover, the argument node linking these two premises to the conclusion that Bob 
is biased is defeasibly valid, because that it fits the scheme DMP.  Hence the conclusion that Bob 
is biased is automatically calculated by CAS as accepted. 
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              Figure 7: Third Step in Evaluating the Expert Opinion Example 
 
     Let’s say as well that the con argument with the premise that Bob is biased is taken to be 
defeasibly valid, because it fits a scheme. The outcome of this situation is that the argument node 
shown just above this one is now shown with a white background. What has happened here is 
that the bottom argument about Bob being biased has undercut the con argument from expert 
opinion just above it. This means that one of the requirements for the argument from expert 
opinion in this argument has not been met, because it has been shown that the expert is biased, 
and therefore the argument from Bob’s expert opinion has now been undercut. So this argument 
is no longer applicable. Note that the counter argument that Bob is biased is not enough to defeat 
the argument shown above it in figure 6. It needs to be supported by evidence to have this effect. 
In other words, there is a burden of proof on the party who claims that Bob is biased to give 
some evidence to support her claim before the bias allegation successfully undercuts the 
argument from Bob’s expert opinion. 
     To sum up, what this argument evaluation has shown, is that the deadlock between the two 
arguments from expert opinion has now been broken, because the second argument from expert 
opinion has been attacked and successfully undercut by a third argument. In other words, what 
has been shown is that the argument from Bob's expert opinion has been nullified, and so now it 
no longer successfully rebuts the argument from Alice’s expert opinion. Hence the ultimate 
conclusion that the painting is a genuine Vermeer has been proved by the total mass of evidence 
that has been considered. So the change from the previous step is that the conclusion that the 
painting is a genuine Vermeer is now shown in a text box with a green background, as contrasted 
with the outcome in figure 6 where that conclusion was shown as not accepted. 
 
6. The Antiphon Example 
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     Plausible reasoning was known to be important in the ancient world well before the time of 
Carneades. The Sophists used eikotic reasoning, also called reasoning from plausibility, using 
the term eikos, meaning “what seems likely”. Eikos is often translated as plausibility. Eikotic 
arguments are based on common experience (Tindale, 2010, 69-82) and are defeasible, not 
conclusive. A statement that seems likely to be true to one person may seem likely to be false to 
another person, and this is especially true in legal cases where there is a conflict of opinions in a 
trial setting. Although Plato attacked plausible reasoning as unreliable and misleading, as part of 
his denunciation of the Sophists, other schools of thought, such as the Sophists and later the 
Skeptics, thought that plausible reasoning is all we have to go by in practical affairs of life where 
proof beyond all doubt is too high a standard of proof. 
          According to the analysis given in (Walton, Tindale and Gordon, 2014, 114), plausible 
reasoning has ten identifiable characteristics. Six of these are relevant here. 
     1. Plausible reasoning is based on common knowledge. 
     2. Plausible reasoning is defeasible. 
     3. Plausible reasoning is based on the way things generally go in familiar situations. 
     4. Plausible reasoning can be used to fill in implicit premises in incomplete arguments. 
     5. Plausible reasoning is commonly based on appearances from perception.  
     6. Stability is an important characteristic of plausible reasoning.  
These six characteristics of plausible reasoning are illustrated in the two examples given below. 
     Eikotic arguments were used by Sophists to please both sides of a disputed case. The classic 
example in the ancient world (Gagarin, 1994, 50) was the case of the larger and smaller man. In 
a legal case, one of the disputants in an assault case at trial was larger and stronger than the 
other. The smaller man argued that it was not possible that he would start the fight because it is 
obvious that he would get the worst of it. The larger man argued that it is not plausible that he 
would attack such a smaller and weaker man, because he knew that things would go badly for 
him if the case went to court. One of the Sophists, Antiphon, even wrote a series of manuals 
meant to be used as teaching tools to show to his students how to conduct pro-contra 
argumentation in a trial. 
     Another of these cases was analyzed as an example of plausible reasoning in (Walton, Tindale 
and Gordon, 2014, 90). In this case a slave identified the killer of a man who had been murdered, 
before himself dying of blows suffered during the assault. The slave had been accompanying the 
man after both of them had returned from a banquet. Before dying, the slave identified a known 
enemy of the murdered man as the perpetrator. In court, the prosecutor used the following 
arguments from plausibility. He argued that professional criminals would not have killed this 
man, because the victims were found still wearing their cloaks. This argument illustrates 
characteristics 3 and 4 of plausible reasoning, because generally in familiar situations, 
professional criminals do things for profit, so since it is an implicit premise that the cloaks would 
presumably have some value, professional criminals would have taken them. The prosecutor also 
argued that it is not plausible that someone from the banquet killed him, since he would be 
identified by his fellow guests. This argument is based on witness testimony, based on 
perception, illustrating characteristic 5. He also argued that it is not plausible that the man was 
killed because of a quarrel, because people would not quarrel in the dead of night and in a 
deserted spot. In this part of his argument, the prosecutor argued by setting up three hypotheses 
offering different explanations of who committed the murder, and argued that each of them is 
implausible.  
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     Shifting from implausibility to plausibility, the prosecutor produced additional evidence 
indicating that the defendant identified by the slave was the murderer (Walton, Tindale and 
Gordon, 2104, 91). This factual evidence was that in the past the murdered man had brought 
several lawsuits against the defendant and the defendant had lost all of them at great personal 
expense. The prosecutor argued that the defendant bore a grudge against the victim and that for 
this reason it was natural for him to plot against the victim and to kill him. This argument is an 
example of stability (characteristic 6) because it involves consistency of actions that build up 
over a sequence of events. To sum up his case, the prosecutor argued “Who is more likely to 
have attacked him than an individual who had already suffered great injuries at his hands and 
could expect to suffer greater ones still?” (Diels and Kranz, 87 B1: 2.1.5). 
 
7. Evaluating the Argument in the Antiphon Example 
  
     The structure of the sequence of reasoning from the evidence to the ultimate conclusion is 
displayed in figure 8.  
 
 
 
                       Figure 8: Interpretation of the Argument in the Antiphon Case 
 
A plus (minus) sign in a circular argument node indicates a pro (con) argument. A text box with 
a dotted perimeter indicates that the proposition contained in it is an implicit premise, i.e. one not 
explicitly stated in a given text of the case. The expression +WT in the argument node on the left 
represents argument from witness testimony. The ultimate conclusion of the sequence of 
argumentation, the statement that it is plausible that D murdered V, is shown at the far left of 
figure 8. The rest of the argument diagram shows how the evidence in the case put forward by 
the prosecutor is used in his argumentation to support his ultimate conclusion to be proved. We 
don’t know the defendant’s argument, but presumably he offered one. 
     As explained in section 2, CAS evaluates arguments based centrally on two factors: whether 
the audience accepts the premises of an argument, and whether the argument is defeasibly valid 
(called “applicable” in CAS). To say an argument is applicable implies that if the premises of the 
argument are accepted then a presumption is put in place that the conclusion of the argument 
should also be tentatively accepted, subject to critical questioning or to a counterargument 
indicating that the conclusion of the argument should not be accepted. 
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     The witness testimony evidence is shown on the left at the top. There is an argumentation 
scheme for argument from witness testimony (Walton, 2008, 60), and also a scheme for 
argument from motive to action (Walton, 2011), but for simplicity we will not go into the details 
of how the schemes can be applied in this instance. We will assume acceptance of the two 
premises of the witness testimony argument, along with the two circumstantial findings shown in 
green (gray in the printed version) at the far right. We will also assume that the defendant has a 
con argument, shown as based on an acceptable premise at the bottom left of figure 9. 
 
 
 
                       Figure 9: Step 1 of Evaluating the Argument in the Antiphon Case 
 
But is this argument by itself sufficient to prove the claim that D murdered V? In CAS this issue 
depends on the standard of proof required. This case is an ancient example so we don’t know if 
any standard of proof was required to persuade the jury. Quite likely it was not. But assuming a 
reasonably high standard would be required, and assuming the defendant puts up any argument, 
even a sufficiently weak one to raise some doubt, the witness testimony argument is not 
sufficient by itself to prove the ultimate conclusion.  
    Conflicts between pro and con arguments are resolved using proof standards, such as 
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence (Gordon and Walton, 2009). 
The proof standards are not defined numerically, but using thresholds α and β, as follows 
(Gordon and Walton, 2009, 245): The preponderance of the evidence standard for a proposition p 
is met if and only if there is are last one applicable argument pro p, and the maximum weight 
assigned by the audience to the applicable arguments pro p is greater than the maximum weight 
of the applicable arguments con p. The clear and convincing evidence standard is met if and only 
if (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard is met, (2) the maximum weight of the 
applicable pro arguments exceeds some threshold α, and (3) the difference between the 
maximum weight of the applicable pro arguments and the maximum weight of the applicable con 
arguments exceeds some threshold β. 
     Now let’s go on to examine the other evidence in the case. The circumstantial evidence is 
shown on the right. It is composed of two statements that are used as premises in two arguments 
that lead to two separate conclusions. One is the statement that D bore a grudge against V. The 
other is the statement that D could expect to suffer further losses from V. CAS has the capability 
of using the same premise over again in a different argument. In this instance, it uses the same 
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two premises over again in two different arguments. These are different not only because they 
have different conclusions, but also because the inferential links represented by their argument 
nodes represent two different kinds of arguments. Next let’s see how to evaluate this argument. 
     Consider the argument as shown in figure 10. Both of the statements shown at the far right are 
accepted, because both premise statements are parts of the factual evidence in the case. Both 
these statements are shown in green text boxes, indicating that each of them has been accepted 
by the audience. Let’s also say that both of these arguments are defeasibly valid (applicable).  
 
 
                   
                     Figure 10: Step 2 of Evaluating the Argument in the Antiphon Case 
 
Once the circumstantial evidence is brought forward, it supports the conclusion that D bore a 
grudge against V, and it supports the conclusion that D could expect to suffer further losses from 
V. Hence both of these statements are shown in green boxes in figure 10. But what about the two 
implicit generalizations contained in the boxes with dashed borders? 
 
 
         
                Figure 11: Step 3 of Evaluating the Argument in the Antiphon Case 
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Both of these two propositions would be acceptable to the audience as evidence, and both of 
these motive arguments are applicable. The resulting evidential situation is shown in figure 11. 
As shown in figure 11, CAS automatically shows the proposition that it was natural for D to plot 
against V and to kill him in a green text box, indicating that this proposition is accepted, based 
on the argument supporting it. Now the prosecution’s two main arguments are strong enough to 
offset the defendant’s argument, assuming it is taken to be very weak, and the prosecution’s 
argument is strong enough to meet the preponderance of evidence standard.  
     The outcome of the complete evaluation is that all the arguments in the case, once marshaled 
together in the way shown in figures 8-11, provide enough evidence to prove the conclusion that 
it is plausible that D murdered V. So now CAS will automatically show the ultimate conclusion, 
the statement that D murdered V, in green. This outcome depends on how the network of 
argumentation in the case is structured as a directed graph as displayed in these various argument 
diagrams, and on the definitions of the four standards of proof as defined in CAS, as indicated in 
section 8. 
 
8. More Advanced Argument Evaluation Tools 
 
     So far, the examples used to illustrate CAS argument evaluations have been kept relatively 
simple, for purposes of easy exposition. However, it may also be interesting to explain two 
further tools that CAS offers that can optionally be used to make more sophisticated evaluations. 
One is the use of proof standards and the other is the numerical weighting of arguments. We 
have seen that there is a way of evaluating deadlocks, and it was also mentioned in the Antiphon 
example that standards of proof can be used for this purpose. But how this works can be more 
fully explained by defining the four proof standards more precisely (Gordon and Walton, 2009). 
These proof standards are applied using thresholds α and β (Gordon and Walton, 2009, 245). The 
four standards of proof are defined as follows. 
• Scintilla of Evidence  
– There is at least one applicable argument  
• Preponderance of Evidence  
– The scintilla of evidence standard is satisfied, and 
– the maximum weight assigned to an applicable pro argument is greater than the 
maximum weight of an applicable con argument. 
• Clear and Convincing Evidence  
– The preponderance of evidence standard is satisfied  
– the maximum weight of applicable pro arguments exceeds some threshold α, and  
– the difference between the maximum weight of the applicable pro arguments and 
the maximum weight of the applicable con arguments exceeds some threshold β. 
• Beyond Reasonable Doubt  
– The clear and convincing evidence standard is satisfied and  
– the maximum weight of the applicable con arguments is less than some threshold 
γ. 
Notice that on this way of defining the standards of proof, the threshold γ is left open, and is not 
given a fixed numerical value.  
     Another feature available in CAS is that of attaching numerical weights to the arguments in 
an argument graph. The numerical weights represent the strength of the argument, as determined 
by the audience, represented by a fraction between zero and one. Consider the example shown in 
18 
 
figure 12. Argument a2, shown at the bottom, has both premises accepted. The audience accepts 
this argument with strength of 0.4. But there is a counterargument, con argument a1. The sole 
premise of this argument p3 is not accepted by the audience. So at this stage, the pro argument 
wins, and so the ultimate conclusion p1 is shown by CAS as accepted. In figures 12 and 13,  
green (lighter gray in the printed version), means ‘accepted’, red (darker gray in the printed 
version) means ‘rejected’, and white denotes ‘neither accepted nor rejected’ (neither in nor out).  
 
             
 
                Figure 12: First Stage of Evaluation of Example with Weights 
 
But let’s take a closer look at the con argument a1. It has two arguments supporting the premise 
p3, namely a3 and a5. Argument a4 is of no use to support p3, because one of its premises p7 has 
been rejected by the audience. However, argument a5 has both of its premises accepted by the 
audience. Take a look at figure 13 to see how the evaluation proceeds from this point. 
 
                 
                   
                   Figure 13: Second Stage of Evaluation of Example with Weights 
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Since argument a5 has both its premises accepted, this argument is applicable, and therefore its 
conclusion p3 is shown in a green box. Since the premise of the con argument a1 (namely p3) has 
now been accepted, there is one applicable pro argument and one applicable con argument. What 
breaks the deadlock is that the con argument a1 (shown as a rebutter) is stronger than the pro-
argument a2. Hence the ultimate conclusion p1 is refuted. 
     It should be noted that the computational argument evaluation systems surveyed in this paper 
are currently still under development, and rapidly being improved (Walton, 2015). For example, 
a new version of CAS will be available shortly that enables a user to evaluate cumulative 
arguments. This is a type of argument that has already been evaluated as somewhat plausible, but 
needs to be re-evaluated as new evidence comes in. For example a series of tests may be carried 
out, and after each test the argument may be re-evaluated as more plausible or less plausible. 
This feature is especially important for evaluating abductive reasoning used when a hypothesis is 
conjectured on the basis of some evidence, but needs to be re-evaluated as new experimental 
evidence that bears on it comes to be known. 
     Before the advent of this feature, CAS was unable to deal adequately with cumulative 
arguments. A cumulative argument is one where there is a buildup of evidence that either 
supports the plausibility of a given hypothesis based on pro arguments or detracts from its 
possibility based on con arguments. The snake and rope example, the leading example used by 
the philosopher Carneades to illustrate plausible reasoning, is an instance of cumulative 
argumentation. In this example (Walton, Tindale and Gordon, 2014, 12) a man sees what looks 
like a coil of rope in a dimly lit room. Based on his perception of how it appears, but also on his 
inability to view the object clearly in the dim room, he draws the plausible hypothesis that the 
object is a snake. Reasoning on this hypothesis, he jumps over the object. When he looks back 
after jumping, he sees that the object remained immobile. At this point he accepts the hypothesis 
that the object is a rope. But here is a third step in the sequence. He prods the object with a stick 
and sees it remains immobile. He takes this finding to confirm his hypothesis that the object is a 
rope (Walton, Tindale and Gordon, 2014).  
     The current version of CAS does not support the evaluation of cumulative argumentation, and 
although a new research project is underway to build a version of CAS that has this capability, 
the results have not been published yet.  
 
9. Conclusions 
 
     Application of the Bayesian method to the evaluation of arguments in legal and everyday 
conversational arguments takes place by assigning probability values to the subjective belief of 
the arguer. This approach is basically a solitary one, and it confronts the problem of other minds. 
How can I tell what another agent’s beliefs are, since I have no direct access to them? Beliefs, 
desires and intention are called internal “mental states”. In contrast, systems such as CAS are 
acceptance-based. In the language of argumentation theory, the arguments are based on what one 
party takes to be the commitments of the other party. The term ‘commitment’, derived from 
(Hamblin, 1970) is close to, or equivalent to the notion of acceptance (Cohen, 1992). CAS 
evaluates arguments based on input on what the audience of the argument accepts, or does not. 
The audience and the arguer are two distinct entities in the system, and so this system of 
argument evaluation is more social than individualistic in approach.  
     There remains the option, however, that the two approaches could be somehow combined. 
Pollock (1995, 95) was opposed to Bayesianism, a view in which reasons make their conclusions 
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probable to varying degrees, and a conclusion is justified only if it is made sufficiently probable 
as evidence accumulates. Bayesianism, on his account, is associated with probabilism, the view 
that degrees of justification obey the probability calculus. Cohen (1977) argued against 
probabilism, contending that for some inductive arguments one needs some nonstandard 
principles of the probability calculus. Pollock (1995, 99) argued that degrees of justification do 
not work like probabilities. Verheij (2014) has formally modeled Pollock’s theory of 
undercutters, defeaters, and argument strength within probability theory, and put forward a 
modified version of the Bayesian calculus that retains Bayes’ theorem, but rejects the 
conjunction rule for defeasible reasoning even though he maintains that it holds for deductive 
(conclusive) reasoning. The conjunction rule, as noted in section 2,  states that the probability of 
A & B equals the probability of A multiplied by the probability of B, provided that A and B are 
independent. Verheij uses the example of witness testimony evidence to argue that this rule does 
not work for presumptive reasoning. When witness W1 testifies that suspect S1 committed a 
crime and witness W2 testifies that suspect S2 committed the crime, even though each statement 
is presumptively supported by the argumentation scheme for witness testimony, the conclusion 
‘S1 committed the crime and S2 committed the crime’ is not presumptively supported. 
     Given this development, it may become possible to deal with the conjunction fallacy 
explained in section 2 while retaining a variant of the Bayesian conditional probability rule while 
excluding the conjunction rule as applied to presumptive reasoning of the kind used in legal 
argumentation and argumentation in natural language discourse generally. Once this issue is 
sorted out, there may be some way of combining a Bayesian approach with the general approach 
of the methods of argument evaluation outlined in this paper. In the meantime, it has been shown 
that there is a general method of argument evaluation emerging from AI that can be applied to 
evaluating arguments in legal reasoning and in everyday conversational discourse, independently 
of the Bayesian rules for the standard probability calculus. This independent methodology, it has 
been argued in this paper, stands on its own, even though it is dependent on the user’s ability to 
analyze a given argument using argument diagramming methods.  
     Both DefLog and CAS, in addition to being formal computational systems for argument 
evaluation, have argument diagramming (mapping) tools that can be used to assist a user making 
an argument diagram to evaluate a given argument. However, these tools are currently under 
testing and development, and at this stage they are not as easy for beginners to use as many other 
argument mapping tools that are available, such as Rationale, Araucaria, ArguNet and so forth. 
See (Scheuer et al., 2010) for an extensive review of argument mapping tools and a comparative 
description of their features. What is important is not so much the particular tool used to draw an 
argument diagram as understanding the features of the logical and computational system for 
argument evaluation associated with the drawing tool.  
     When working on an example argument to be evaluated, a good practical approach is to start 
by drawing a rough argument diagram with pencil and paper and then later use a mapping tool, 
or even a simple graph drawing software tool, to build a more refined version that can be stored, 
reused, sent to others and later modified. There are drawing tools available that are easy to learn 
and use such as Microsoft Visio, yEd, Gliffy, LucidChart, and so forth, and some are free. These 
tools can be used to draw quite a presentable argument diagram in conjunction with the argument 
evaluation systems currently being built in artificial intelligence described in this paper. By 
manually inserting notations for schemes, audience acceptance and so forth, an argument 
diagram showing how a given argument can be evaluated can be constructed. 
21 
 
     But the aim of this paper is not to show how to use any particular argument mapping 
software. The aim has been to explain enough of the logical and computational structure 
underlying the use of such tools for argument evaluation to enable a user to gain some idea of 
how to go about evaluating arguments. For those who have not been able to successfully apply 
Bayesian rules to examples of natural language arguments or legal arguments they wish to 
evaluate, the method of argument evaluation outlined in this paper offers an alternative.  
     Applying the general method of argument evaluation outlined in this paper depends on the 
ability to interpret natural language texts to reconstruct arguments and other informal logic skills. 
The methods described in this paper are not completely automatic or mechanical, and cannot be. 
The tools presented in this paper are argument assistants. Applying these computational methods 
requires six basic informal logic skills: (1) a knowledge of argumentation schemes, (2) the ability 
to represent the structure of a given argument using an argument diagram in the form of a 
directed graph, (3) the ability to apply the schemes to the diagram, (4) the ability to fill in gaps in 
the diagram created by implicit premises or conclusions, and (5) the ability to use the device of 
the audience as applied to the given case to judge which premises are accepted by the audience. 
In addition, (6) the ability to apply differing standards of proof to the argumentation in a given 
case may be needed in some instances, as illustrated in the Antiphon example.  
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